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ABSTRACT
The existing literature suggests that gated communities and master-planned
estates represent a form of private governance. They are a response to the
state’s retreat from providing public goods. In post-reform China, newer
residential development projects also take the form of gated neighbour-
hoods. To what extent do these neighbourhoods represent a new form of
“private governance”? Results from the perspective of residents reveal that
the meaning of “private governance” refers to services delivered by private
organisations rather than self-governance. Gated neighbourhoods in urban
China are a response to the state’s intention to retreat from serviced land
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Since the 1990s, gated residential neighbourhoods have been widely developed in diﬀerent
regions, reﬂecting shifts towards neoliberal modes of urban governance (Blakely and Snyder
1997, Chen and Webster 2005, Glasze et al. 2005, Roitman 2005, Cséfalvay 2011, Pow 2011),
and representing a form of private governance (McKenzie 1994). Existing research has deﬁned
private governance as providing public services through organisations that are privately held and
governed by residents (Gordon 2004). In North America, the gated community as private
governance has residents who elect the homeowners’ association to run the community by their
own rules (Blakely and Snyder 1997). In Sydney, Australia, the signiﬁcant growth of master-
planned estates represents a growing phenomenon in favour of the market and the private sector
(Cheshire et al. 2010). The use of private compacts in these gated estates recasts residents’
everyday practices and reshapes residents’ relationships with the public realm (McGuirk and
Dowling 2007). Many studies, mostly conducted within the circumstances of a liberalised housing
system, agree that private governance provides residents with eﬃciency and autonomy (Atkinson
et al. 2005, Goodman et al. 2010).
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In urban China, state provision and governance of socialist work-unit housing ended in
1998. As alternatives, newer residential development projects similar to gated communities
and master-planned estates have proliferated as one of the dominant residential neighbour-
hood forms over the past decade. They have shown salient features of private governance, and
thus have stimulated substantial public and scholarly debates (Huang 2005, Pow 2011,
Breitung 2012, Hendrikx and Wissink 2017). Institutional changes, fundamentally the state’s
deepened market reforms relating to land and housing development, have encouraged the
privatisation of housing and public goods provision. Especially during the ongoing suburba-
nisation process, local governments developed incentives to draw the private sector into
developing residential land and turned suburbs into spaces of capital accumulation (Zhang
2010, Shen and Wu 2017). Furthermore, central government enacted property management
regulations and homeowners’ association regulations, respectively, in 2007 and 2009. These
private organisations have been formalised to take charge of maintaining facilities, providing
services, and representing homeowners’ rights in the neighbourhood. Changed governance in
housing privatisation has received as much attention as and possibly more than centralised
governance in existing neighbourhoods (Lu et al. 2018, Wu 2018a).
Apart from supply-side changes, demands for “private governance” among residents them-
selves have also been strengthened. The reasons are threefold. First, the privatisation of public
goods at the neighbourhood level has stimulated residents’ responsibilities in terms of mana-
ging their neighbourhoods and hence securing the value of their estates. Second, the market-
isation of neighbourhood services has been catching up with residents’ growing consumption
in everyday practices. Third, the variegation of gated residential development projects has
provided residents with a variety of options for pursuing better neighbourhood experiences.
However, little research attention has been paid to residents’ preferences for and satisfaction
with “private governance”. One reason is that the weakness of the private sector, for example,
civic organisations, in China has restricted residents’ choices (Read 2012, Fu and Lin 2013);
another reason is that housing privatisation is designed to secure greater household privacy
under state hegemony for the emerging middle class, as indicated by Pow’s (2009) research in
Shanghai, rather than giving residents choices regarding neighbourhood governance. Under
such circumstances, a more nuanced understanding of the meaning of “private governance” in
urban China is worth considering.
Limited research has tended to examine factors that may inﬂuence residents’ preference for
private governance, with a few exceptions. During a study exploring levels of support for
privatisation in Toronto, Walks (2008) identiﬁes that the spatial factors of residential settlements,
for instance, suburban locations, have the most profound impact on residents’ preferences. When
evaluating the choice between public space and private space in Phoenix, Kirby (2008, p. 92)
argues that rather than being “wielded directly by representatives of the state”, residents deliber-
ately choose privately managed spaces for practical reasons, such as better neighbourhood
services. Moreover, based on a study of Seoul’s gated communities, Woo and Webster (2014)
propose that a more scientiﬁc assessment of governmental eﬃciency is needed to clarify many
assumptions arising from the debates. This paper intends to study “private governance” from the
perspective of residents in the context of post-reform China. Exactly what factors have driven
residents to prefer diﬀerent models of management in gated residential neighbourhoods? And to
what extent do these gated residential neighbourhoods represent a new form of “private govern-
ance” in urban China? This paper intends to answer these research questions by drawing on a
large-scale questionnaire survey conducted in the city of Wenzhou in China. The rest of this paper
is organised to review the existing debates related to private governance and the emergence of
“private governance” in post-reform China, followed by an explanation of survey methods and
analyses of empirical evidence in Wenzhou. Multinomial logistic models are used to identify the
ways in which diﬀerent factors aﬀect residents’ preferences and satisfaction, as well as
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diﬀerentiations among gated residential neighbourhoods. Further discussions of the meaning of
“private governance” in urban China and a conclusion are also provided.
2. The Current Debate on Private Governance
Burgeoning research has concentrated on gated residential neighbourhoods, ranging from master-
planned estates in Australia (McGuirk and Dowling 2007), gated communities in North America
(Low 2003, Kirby 2008) and Europe (Webster 2002, Raposo 2006, Cséfalvay 2011, Hirt 2012),
enclaves for the global elite in Singapore (Pow 2011), to porous space in the Philippines (Fauveaud
2016). Scholars have deﬁned these gated residential neighbourhoods as forms of private govern-
ance wherein homeowners create their own covenants and contract private ﬁrms for professional
management (McKenzie 1994, Gordon 2004). Three perspectives have been raised for examining
private governance. The ﬁrst perspective uses Buchanan’s (1965) club theory to explain the private
provision of goods and services (Le Goix 2005, Le Goix and Webster 2008). With private
governance, each gated residential neighbourhood becomes a club of consumers who pay mem-
bership fees for using club goods and services collectively. This perspective emphasises the
eﬃciency of private governance because the exclusivity of “club goods” overcomes the problems
of free riders and public interventions (Webster 2002). The development of club realms also helps
local governments to raise tax revenues and to relieve congestion in the public realm. The
“clubbisation” of governance has also been understood as a market-driven process by Charmes
(2009); his study of Paris suburban communes suggests that the market provision of public goods
and services reduces public expenditure on suburban governance.
The second perspective stresses private governance for shareholder democracy (McKenzie
2005). Self-governance organisations act as agents of private governance under agreements
made among homeowners. Cséfalvay (2011) considers that homeowners in gated communities
undertake self-governance to secure the value of private property and to cope with local
governance failure. McGuirk and Downling (2007) have demonstrated that master-planned
estates adopt a private governance structure to entitle neighbourhood communal properties
and to enforce neighbourhood covenants. Through private governance, property shareholders
are able to “vote with their feet”, and hence to ensure “a supply of civic goods which
apparently are better acquired there than elsewhere” in the urban area (Webster 2001, p.
153). Kirby (2008, p. 12) also refers to the core implication – private governance is to be
“policed by those who inhabit it”.
The third perspective is the theory of exit and voice option. Cséfalvay (2011) argues that none
of the above perspectives can fully explain the complexity of private governance. He then raises
the public choice perspective based on Hirschman’s (1970) work on the exit option and voice
option, highlighting residents’ preferences regarding local government and private governance.
Speciﬁcally, when residents become disaﬀected with local government, they either pay additional
costs to move to private governance, i.e. taking the exit option, or alternatively they stay with local
government and express dissatisfaction through their voices. The exit option regards residents as
voluntarily choosing private governance over local government in accordance with their prefer-
ences and mobility, whereas the voice option reﬂects democratic political contexts within which
residents can express their demands without migrating or paying extra costs. Cséfalvay (2011)
suggests that this perspective explains why gated communities are not common in central Europe
because the voice option is profoundly rooted in their decentralised political systems, while
private governance, the exit option, is also particularly costly there. Moreover, Roitman (2005)
points out that gated residential neighbourhoods have been proliferating rapidly in developing
countries. This is because local states in developing countries are more likely to promote costly
exit options for economic growth than to provide suﬃcient non-proﬁtable public goods as voice
options for urban residents. This perspective considers social spatial diﬀerentiations as resulting
from the diﬀerences between private governance and local government. Residents with higher
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mobility and similar demands may turn to private governance, while residents with low socio-
economic status stick to local government.
In summary, private governance highlights the eﬃciency of service provision, together with the
autonomy of self-governance, at the neighbourhood level. However, the characteristics of private
governance vary under speciﬁc local contexts. There is no empirical evidence on the perspective of
residents’ preferences in situations where the eﬀects of both the exit option and the voice option
are restricted.
3. The Emergence of “Private Governance” in Post-Reform China
Since the deepening of housing privatisation in 1998, the state welfare housing system has been
replaced by the market provision of private property ownership (Wang and Murie 2000, Zhou and
Logan 2008). Residential development projects which used to be ﬁnanced and managed by the
public sector in the work-unit era have begun to show features of “private governance” over the
last decade. Prior research has deﬁned newer gated residential development projects – physically
enclosed and developed since housing privatisation in 1998 – as gated neighbourhoods (Pow
2009, Zhang 2010). Residential forms such as urban villages and prior work-unit housing are not
included. Attempts have been made to consider gated residential neighbourhoods as club realms
for private provision of services (Wu and Webber 2004, Wu 2005, Hendrikx and Wissink 2017).
This strand of literature suggests that property management companies establish a fee-paying
scheme with residents for neighbourhood management. Apart from service provision, research on
grassroots governance acknowledges that homeowners’ associations bring homeowners together
to protect the rights of private property (Read 2003, Tomba 2005). Therefore, gated residential
development projects demonstrate important features of “private governance”.
In addition, “private governance” has been enhanced by the decentralisation of urban govern-
ance for local growth. During rapid processes of suburbanisation, local governments have been
confronted with ﬁnancial burdens in providing public goods and maintaining services. By
supporting “private governance”, local governments transfer these administrative costs at the
neighbourhood level to the private sector, which subsequently charges the users. Recent studies
stress that decentralising neighbourhood governance has become an essential measure for local
governments to attract private capital to invest in suburban residential and infrastructure devel-
opment (Fleischer 2010, Shen and Wu 2012). Under these circumstances, gated residential
development projects – mostly evident in suburban areas – have been developed, ﬁnanced and
managed by the private sector.
Meanwhile, the consumption demands of residents for “private governance” have been fostered
since the move from welfare housing to private properties. Scholars have tested residents’
satisfaction with aspects of the neighbourhood built environment, advocating the importance of
neighbourhood maintenance for increasing satisfaction (Fang 2006, Wu 2010, Li et al. 2012, Li
and Wu 2013). Inﬂuenced by consumerist culture, residents have begun to pursue middle-class
lifestyles (Davis 2000). In gated communities in Shanghai, aesthetic landscapes, privilege and the
moral order of the good life, as symbols of middle-class lifestyles, are delivered by private
governance (Pow 2009). Existing neighbourhood studies also imply that urban residents show
an increasing awareness of self-governance through the establishment of private governance
organisations (Chen and Webster 2005, Huang 2006, Zhang 2010).
However, a series of studies on neighbourhood governance argues that the state has continued
to play a dominant role in organising neighbourhoods in urban China (Hsing 2010, Lin 2011).
Despite land and housing reforms activating the privatisation of property ownership, the state
continues to be the ultimate owner of urban land and the regulator of urban aﬀairs. Within this
context, studies consider that gated residential development projects have primarily emerged to
replace the retreat of the state from the provision of housing and public services, and secondly to
open new avenues of revenue for local growth by suburbanisation and urban regeneration (Wu
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2018b). In this scenario, “private governance” is limited. Huang (2005) argues that the home-
owners’ association is in fact a phantom agent launched by local governments to restore neigh-
bourhood governance.
Therefore, the formation of “private governance” is diﬀerent in the context of urban China due
to strong state intervention. First, according to the club theory, privatised services in gated
communities are provided for eﬃciency and exclusivity. Since the state’s retreat from the provi-
sion of neighbourhood services, market forces have been used to supplement inadequate public
services and to boost property management industries in urban China. However, property
management companies do not guarantee the eﬃciency of neighbourhood services provision
because delivery is managed in accordance with property management fees, which are decided by
local government.
Second, the method of shareholder democracy is not possible because residents do not have
suﬃcient power to determine the system of neighbourhood governance in urban China.
Although homeowners’ associations have gradually emerged for managing neighbourhoods,
they are set up with an acutely practical purpose to supervise property management compa-
nies. Homeowners’ associations lack autonomy and ﬁnancial independence and have poor
representation of residents.
Third, in the exit and voice option theory, private governance is the result when residents
are not satisﬁed with the local government and have hence taken an exit. Alternatively,
residents choose to stay with local public services and voice their demands through local
government. This exit and voice theory explains the transformation from government-led to
self-governance; however, it is not suﬃcient to explain “private governance” in China. First,
residents cannot freely choose the provision of public goods. The state has established policies,
such as national planning codes, to standardise the provision of public goods at the neigh-
bourhood level. Concurrently, local government has nominated state agencies to regulate
private provision. The main purpose of introducing “private governance” is not to respond
to residential demands, but rather to stimulate the housing market and generate local revenues
from residential land leasing.
Based on our review of the above literature, we found that residents have been able to exert
more inﬂuence in terms of shaping neighbourhoods, although the state remains a dominating role
in their governance. Examining the perspective of residents regarding “private governance” and
the determinative factors oﬀers a new research approach, while simultaneously providing empiri-
cal evidence of the relation between residents and “private governance” under the condition of
strong state intervention in post-reform China.
4. Data and Methods
This research is based on a large-scale questionnaire survey conducted in the Wenzhou
municipal area, which includes the districts of Lucheng, Ouhai and Longwan, from March
to May in 2013. Wenzhou is a densely populated city with more than nine million registered
residents. The city is also well known for having the most active private economy in China,
with the private sector taking more than 80% of local GDP (Wei et al. 2007). Since the
termination of work-unit housing in 1999, residential developments have become a pillar
industry for local economic growth, attracting tremendous investment from the local private
sector. Oﬃcial statistics from 2000 to 2010 indicate that the scale of average annual invest-
ment in new residential development projects is more than 10 billion Yuan, with the private
sector contributing 81.7% in total; as a result, in 2010, 42.6% of residents in Wenzhou were
private homeowners (Wenzhou Statistical Bureau 2010).
In the city of Wenzhou, gated residential neighbourhoods are commonly seen in suburban
areas where large-scale new residential developments were planned. For their development,
national planning codes require real estate developers to be responsible for providing residents
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with public goods, including green spaces with recreation facilities, grocery stores, educational
institutions such as nurseries and kindergartens, security control centres and waste collection
points. The amount and quality of public goods originating from private provision vary in gated
residential neighbourhoods. For their management, private organisations as constituted by prop-
erty management companies and homeowners’ associations are in direct charge. Neighbourhood
services are entirely privatised and delivered by professional property management companies at
additional cost to residents. Homeowners’ associations have been widely established to carry out
homeowners’ decisions in neighbourhood management. Meanwhile, the local government still has
an administrative role at the neighbourhood level. Therefore, in each sampled gated residential
neighbourhood, local government agencies, property management companies, and homeowners’
associations all exist. Therefore, in this research, residents of sampled gated residential develop-
ments have experience of all three types of management.
Empirically, three forms of gated residential neighbourhoods, including market-led, mixed and
state-led development projects are recognised in the research area. A market-led development
project is exclusively for market buyers. They are often located in a suburban area. A mixed
development project contains aﬀordable housing, involving both the state and market for devel-
opment. Its market mechanisms receive strong state intervention under aﬀordable housing
provision schemes. A state-led development project is initiated by the government to relocate
residents whose properties have been demolished in massive redevelopment projects. Three
distinct forms of gated residential neighbourhoods represent diﬀerent state–market–society rela-
tions, and thus they have variegated management models.
Regarding the questionnaire survey, this study followed the Probability Proportional to Size
sampling method. It ﬁrst sampled 11 out of 559 gated residential neighbourhoods in the Wenzhou
municipal area, and secondly randomly selected 94 households in every gated residential devel-
opment identiﬁed, aiming at 1,034 valid questionnaires in total. Figure 1 shows the location of the
sampled gated residential neighbourhoods. The two-step sampling ensured an equal probability of
being surveyed for each household. Questionnaires were delivered to heads of household or their
spouses. Sampled households were visited and had their questionnaires ﬁlled on site. The quality
of responses was checked before being collected, so as to ensure the quality of the survey.
The attributes surveyed constitute three sets: (1) respondent’s socio-economic proﬁles; (2)
preferences for and satisfaction with diﬀerent management models; and (3) everyday practices in
the neighbourhood. Table 1 shows the socio-demographic status of sampled respondents in gated
residential neighbourhoods. Over 93% of sampled households have private ownership of their
properties in the neighbourhood. The majority of respondents hold an educational degree from
college, university or above and work for the private sector. The last set of attributes measures
whether residents use particular goods that are privately provided in gated residential neighbour-
hoods as frequencies of contacting property management companies and homeowners’ associa-
tions. Additionally, neighbourhood factors include respondents’ housing types, degree of facility
provision in neighbourhood and neighbourhood forms. This set of data was collected by on-site
observation and by reviewing planning documents for gated residential development projects.
Multinomial logistic regression analyses have been employed in this research, with the inten-
tion of revealing the factors that produce signiﬁcant impacts to shape residents’ preferences.
Speciﬁcally, the dependent variable in the ﬁrst multinomial regression model is residents’ pre-
ference for neighbourhood management among property management companies, homeowners’
associations and local government agencies. This model reveals the factors behind the preference
for “private governance”. The second multinomial regression model identiﬁes diﬀerentiations
among three gated residential neighbourhoods. It focuses on examining whether residents are
segregated into diﬀerent forms of gated residential neighbourhoods due to the diﬀerent contents
of management. The third model tests residents’ satisfaction with property management compa-
nies and homeowners’ associations, inspecting whether they emphasise the practical beneﬁts of
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private management or its symbolic meaning of self-governance. The dependent variables of
residents’ satisfaction are measured by binary answers, namely “satisﬁed” and “not satisﬁed”.
At the same time, qualitative analysis is used to oﬀer supplementary explanations for the results
of the regression models. This set of data is drawn from interviews conducted from December
2013 to March 2015 with residents of diﬀerent forms of gated residential neighbourhoods and
covers a variety of social groups in terms of age and occupation.
5. Findings: The Determinants of Residents’ Preferences for “Private Governance”
Table 2 shows the results of multinomial logistic regression, testing the signiﬁcance of diﬀerent
attributes in determining residents’ preferences among property management companies, home-
owners’ associations and government agents in gated residential neighbourhoods. Survey data
reveal that an overwhelming amount of residents prefer private organisations in the neighbour-
hood, with 81.2% of residents choosing property management companies and 8.6% of residents
choosing homeowners’ associations. Those who prefer government agencies take up the remain-
ing 10.2% of the total amount, and are considered as the reference group in this analysis. Model 1
N
0  0.5          3km
0.1  1km Sample of mixed development










Sample of market-led development 
Qidu Island
Figure 1. Location of the sampled gated residential neighbourhoods.
Table 1. Socio-demographic status of residents in gated residential neighbourhoods in Wenzhou.
Variables Description Number of respondents Percentage in total
Marital status Married 907 87.7
Gender Female 400 38.7
Property tenure Owned 965 93.3
Educational attainment Primary school and below 35 3.4
Secondary school 373 36.1
College, university and above 626 60.5
Occupation Public sector 254 24.6
Private sector 644 62.3
Unemployed 136 13.1
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examines the eﬀects of residents’ socio-economic attributes and neighbourhood factors, while
Model 2 includes attributes of residents’ neighbourhood experiences for a full analysis. As a result,
the ﬁrst model is weak in explaining the diﬀerences of residents’ preferences, while the second
model has greatly improved model signiﬁcance, Cox and Snell R2, and Nagelkerke R2.
Overall, residents’ preferences among property management companies, homeowners’ associa-
tions and local government agents are more likely to be inﬂuenced by neighbourhood forms and
everyday practices, regardless of their educational level, occupation and household income level. It
is diﬃcult to identify the social groups who support property management companies and
homeowners’ associations, thereby suggesting that socio-economic status hardly determines
residents’ preferences for “private governance”. Housing quality and neighbourhood quality
hardly have an inﬂuence on their preferences.
Residents’ everyday practices regarding “private governance” are interpreted by two kinds of
factors: using the private provision of public goods in gated residential neighbourhoods and
contacting the relevant private governance organisations. In this research, only three categories of
public goods are found in all samples, namely recreation facilities, nurseries and grocery stores.
Speciﬁc to the use of them in these gated residential neighbourhoods, 52.0% of residents report
using recreation facilities, while 36.8% and 37.0% of residents, respectively, use nurseries and
grocery stores. The results show that residents using recreation facilities in the neighbourhood are
more likely to support property management companies. Additionally, the odds ratio of this
factor is among the highest, conﬁrming that good packages of facilities from private provision
Table 2. Residents’ preferences for diﬀerent neighbourhood management (multinomial regression models: the reference
group = prefer government agencies).













B SE B SE B SE B SE
Intercept 1.424* .608 .464 .795 .987 1.100 −.616 1.488
Gender (female = 1) .585* .238 .244 .323 .446 .245 .131 .331
Marital status (married = 1) −.121 .387 −.426 .487 −.190 .401 −.415 .504
Level of household monthly income .034 .113 −.081 .155 .057 .120 −.051 .162
Age −.006 .010 −.017 .013 −.014 .011 −.029 .014
Education attainment (reference: College, University, and above)
Primary school and below .964 .782 .950 .980 .950 .792 .655 1.006
Middle school .022 .258 .172 .353 −.083 .270 .027 .366
ccupation (reference: unemployed)
Public sector −.031 .374 −.059 .521 −.035 .398 −.060 .545
Private sector .482 .333 .252 .455 .444 .352 .130 .473
Frequency of contacting property
management company
1.102*** .274 .870* .368
Frequency of contacting homeowners’
association
.019 .207 .941** .272
Using recreation facilities in neighbourhood .673** .246 .446 .330
Using nurseries in neighbourhood .153 .257 .132 .343
Using grocery stores in neighbourhood −.200 .241 −.707* .345
Degree of facility provision in
neighbourhood
−.011 .200 −.055 .273
Housing type (reference: detached villa)
Low-rise building −.712 .884 .006 1.223
High-rise building −.392 .789 .470 1.078
Neighbourhood form (reference: state-led)
Market-led 1.008*** .267 .689 .370 .708** .289 .417 .395
Mixed .106 .255 .302 .361 .190 .572 .440 .791
Note: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. In model 1, Cox and Snell R2 = 0.041, Nagelkerke R2 = 0.058, p < 0.01. In model 2, Cox
and Snell R2 = 0.097, Nagelkerke R2 = 0.137, p < 0.001.
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strongly contribute to residents’ preference for professional management. In contrast, using
grocery stores in the neighbourhood decreases residents’ support for homeowners’ associations.
This is because many grocery stores in the neighbourhood are rented and open to all consumers,
which is agreed by homeowners’ associations. However, residents consider that this threatens
homeowners’ beneﬁts as stakeholders of private properties. At the same time, it is reasonable to
ﬁnd that residents are more likely to support the organisations they contact more frequently,
while frequent use of neighbourhood services leads to support for private governance organisa-
tions in general.
Implications can be seen here. On the one hand, private providers focus on packaging gated
residential neighbourhoods with recreational facilities rather than providing costly functions such
as education and commerce for residents, leaving residential demands for the latter mostly outside
neighbourhood provision. On the other hand, residents’ preference for “private governance” is
generated from neighbourhood experiences, particularly by using public goods in gated residential
neighbourhoods and contacting private governance organisations.
Furthermore, living in market-led residential development projects tends to indicate a
preference for property management companies, even when the attributes of socio-economic
status, the built environment quality and neighbourhood living experiences are controlled. In
suburban areas where governance is relatively weak and fragmented, the allocation of public
resources from local government to meet residents’ demands is hardly suﬃcient or eﬀective.
By adopting market mechanisms, market-led residential development projects provide high
quality services, charging residents expensive management fees. Property management com-
panies are likely to provide satisfying services for residents’ everyday uses, aiming to develop a
trustful relationship with homeowners, thereby to renew their contracts and raise service
prices. This provokes the prevalence of consumerist culture. Three key words were frequently
mentioned by residents in justifying the reasoning behind their preferences for property
management companies: “contracted”, “profession” and “trust”, as shown in the interview
with a resident:
We are in fact consumers; the property management company is hired to solve neighbourhood problems for
us, providing neighbourhood services we need; they arrive at once when we demand, and have nice attitudes
to us. (resident of market-led residential development project, interviewed on 29 December 2013)
To better understand the diﬀerences between the three forms of gated residential neigh-
bourhoods, another multinomial regression model was conducted, with results shown in
Table 3. Overall, both attributes of residents’ socio-economic status and everyday experi-
ences are strong in diﬀerentiating these gated residential neighbourhoods. It is evident that
residents of market-led residential development projects are likely to have a high income
and educational level. They also have a strong tendency to live in spacious ﬂats or villas,
which again conﬁrms their wealth. On the other hand, the households of mixed residential
development projects are not well established in terms of socio-economic status, for exam-
ple, being young and being renters rather than property owners. Compared with state-led
residential development projects that have newly emerged during urban redevelopment
processes, the residents of mixed developments tend to have been settled in their neighbour-
hoods for a longer time.
When the socio-economic attributes of residents are controlled, the contents provided by
diﬀerent forms of gated residential neighbourhoods can be distinguished. The results conﬁrm
the previous analysis that, compared with state-led residential development projects, residents
living in market-led developments are more likely to use neighbourhood facilities and neighbour-
hood services, and frequently turn to property management companies rather than homeowners’
associations. In contrast, mixed residential development projects do not share any similar out-
comes in terms of management content. In fact, residents of mixed developments have a higher
likelihood of frequent contact with homeowners’ associations.
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Analyses so far suggest that, compared with relocated residents, market buyers are more
concerned with the quality of private provision, while aﬀordable housing residents who have
relatively lower consumption tendencies turn to contacting homeowners’ associations. It
further appears that residents are separated by diﬀerent gated residential neighbourhoods
due to being attracted by the diﬀerent management models that gated residential neighbour-
hoods adopt. First, through market-driven processes, market-led residential development
projects provide neighbourhood services and facilities that meet residents’ consumption
demands. Dissimilar to market-led developments, mixed residential development projects
oﬀer aﬀordability for residents and hence place less emphasis on costly provision. Residents
in state-led developments were relocated through government redevelopment policies and did
not voluntarily choose “private governance”. The change in service provision and management
has been imposed on them.
Second, mixed residential development projects with a longer established time are generally
found close to the city centre, while market-led residential development projects mostly emerge in
suburbs. Living near the well-established city centre allows residents convenient access to public
facilities and a diversity of city services in their everyday practices, rather than relying on private
provision in the gated residential neighbourhood. In contrast, as the local government retreats
from providing serviced land for suburban residential development, the residents of suburban
gated residential neighbourhoods have very few alternatives but to rely heavily on the private
sector for services and management in everyday practices.
Furthermore, logistic regression analyses of the likelihood of being satisﬁed with property
management companies and homeowners’ associations were carried out; this is demonstrated in
Table 4. The satisfaction with private governance organisations is generally low, as 45.2% of the
sample respondents responded as being satisﬁed with the former, while the proportion of
respondents expressing satisfaction with the latter can be identiﬁed as 17.6%. The much lower
satisfaction with homeowners’ associations suggests that they fail to adequately represent all
homeowners and convey self-governance in the neighbourhood. This again conﬁrms earlier
analyses whereby services commodiﬁcation is better performed than self-governance among
residents in gated residential neighbourhoods.
Residents’ satisfaction with property management companies and homeowners’ associations
appears to be inﬂuenced by diﬀerent determinants in the diﬀerent models. In analysing satisfac-
tion with property management companies, attributes reveal that residents using public goods and
contacting private governance organisations are all signiﬁcant. When it comes to residents’ socio-
Table 3. Diﬀerentiations of the three forms of gated residential neighbourhoods (multinomial regression models: the reference
group = state-led residential development projects).
Model 1 Model 2
Market-led Mixed Market-led Mixed
B SE B SE B SE B SE
Intercept −2.689*** .563 1.575*** .689 −3.453*** .615 −2.592*** .731
Level of household monthly income .234** .085 −.004 .108 .159* .082 .007 .111
Age .005 .007 −.037* .009 .001 .008 −.032** .010
Property ownership (owner = 1) .423 .316 −.897 .402 .300 .324 −1.050* .405
Property ﬂoor space .010*** .003 .005 .004 .009** .003 .005 .004
Educational attainment (university degree and
above = 1)
.601** .174 .096 .230 .645*** .179 .246 .234
Commuting time .006 .003 −.009 .005 .006* .003 −.009 .006
Years of residence .035 .036 .532*** .043 .044 .037 .537*** .043
Using recreation facilities in neighbourhood .370* .150 .173 .192
Frequency of contacting homeowners’ association .125 .148 .443* .188
Frequency of contacting property management
company
.701*** .186 −.043 .238
Note: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. In model 1, Cox and Snell R2 = 0.326, Nagelkerke R2 = 0.371, p < 0.001. In model 2,
Cox and Snell R2 = 0.354, Nagelkerke R2 = 0.403, p < 0.001.
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economic status, similar results are found: females and high-income earners are more likely to
report satisfaction with property management companies. However, it is noteworthy that resi-
dents working for the public sector are less likely to feel satisﬁed with the private provision of
neighbourhood services. They tend to consider that state agencies, rather than the private sector,
hold the proper power in relation to neighbourhood governance, as shown in the interview with a
resident in a mixed development:
I believe it is government departments that have the duty of governing residents’. (resident of mixed
residential development project, interviewed on 7 January 2014)
Neighbourhood form is the next highlighted factor, while the remaining factors relating to
housing quality and neighbourhood quality have little impact on independent variables.
Compared to state-led residential development projects, market-led developments are more likely
to satisfy residents in terms of property management, while mixed developments have poorer
services provision which disappoints residents the most. It is noteworthy that on being relocated
to gated residential neighbourhoods residents are obliged to pay property management companies
a property services fee that they never had to pay in urban villages. The imposed service fees and
the dramatic changes in their everyday practices lead relocated residents to become involved in
conﬂicts with property management companies, resulting in the fact that this group of residents
rarely favours property management companies, as shown in the interview with a resident in a
state-led residential development:
I do not communicate with staﬀ of the property management company. There is nothing to communicate
about with them, and I don’t pay for neighbourhood service fees. (resident of state-led residential develop-
ment project, interviewed on 8 January 2014)
In contrast, as shown in Model 2, very few personal attributes and neighbourhood attributes have
signiﬁcance in impacting residents’ satisfaction with homeowners’ associations. At the same time,
Table 4. Residents’ satisfaction with property management company and homeowners’ association in gated residential
neighbourhoods (logistic regressions: reference = not satisﬁed).
Independent variables
Model 1 Model 2




B SE B SE
Intercept −1.773** .638 −2.026** .771
Female .304* .144 .084 .185
Marital status (married = 1) −.249 .227 −.395 .275
Household monthly income level .145* .073 .000 .092
Age −.001 .007 −.011 .008
Educational attainment (reference: college, university, and above)
Primary school and below .619 .412 .683 .464
Middle school −.057 .164 .071 .208
Occupation (reference: unemployed)
Public sector −.676** .258 −.289 .321
Private sector −.365 .224 −.136 .268
Frequency of contacting property management company .998*** .161 .643** .193
Frequency of contacting homeowners’ association .395** .122 1.298*** .154
Frequency of using facilities in the community .419** .125 .523** .157
Degree of facility provision in neighbourhood .127 .126 −.116 .162
Housing type (reference: detached villa)
Low-rise building −.026 .482 .303 .575
High-rise building −.454 .387 −.214 .433
Neighbourhood form (reference: state-led)
Market-led .378* .174 −.216 .225
Mixed −.815* .365 −.195 .462
Note: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. In model 1, Cox and Snell R2 = 0.139, Nagelkerke R2 = 0.186, p < 0.001. In model 2,
Cox and Snell R2 = 0.139, Nagelkerke R2 = 0.222, p < 0.001.
URBAN POLICY AND RESEARCH 11
factors of neighbourhood experiences, such as frequency of contacting homeowners’ associations
and frequency of contacting property management companies, tend to have similar eﬀects on
residents’ perceptions of homeowners’ associations. Homeowners’ associations fail in delivering
satisfying work in response to residents’ demands because the state has placed restrictions on the
governance power of homeowners’ associations, as shown in the interview with a resident of a
mixed residential development project:
The homeowners’ association contacts me only if it is about to elect the board; however, I think the
homeowners’ association should represent residents in every aspect and bring forward residents’ decisions;
then it should hire a property management company to convey these decisions. (resident of mixed
residential development project, interviewed on 12 January 2014)
6. Conclusion
Private governance has been encouraged as an innovative approach for local neighbourhoods
to navigate urban changes since the end of the twentieth century (Imrie and Raco 1999). In
gated communities in the US context, private governance underlines the role of homeowners’
associations, representing the surging demand for self-governance (McKenzie 2005). In
Australia, meanwhile, private governance in master-planned estates is largely supported for
the production of suburban residential space (McGuirk and Dowling 2007). The development
of gated residential neighbourhoods in diﬀerent regions reﬂects the withdrawal of the welfare
state in allocating public resources and the adoption of neoliberal urban governance. China is
also developing new forms of gated residential neighbourhoods. Yet the underlying mechan-
ism reveals diﬀerent state–market relations.
This paper has examined the preference for diﬀerent forms of neighbourhood management
and satisfaction from the perspectives of residents in the city of Wenzhou in China.
Speciﬁcally, we explored whether residents prefer property management companies to govern-
ment agencies for neighbourhood governance, and whether residents are satisﬁed by diﬀerent
management types. We have found that the preference for private management companies
over governance by government agencies is evident across residents with diﬀerent socio-
economic status. This preference is clearly aﬀected by everyday practices in gated residential
neighbourhoods; for instance, when there is frequent use of private provision or living in a
market-led residential development project, it becomes stronger, similar to the ﬁndings of
Walks (2008, p. 279) in the city of Toronto that suburban forms can lead to increased support
for privatisation. Nevertheless, residents’ satisfaction with homeowners’ associations are gen-
erally low as for most residents gated residential neighbourhoods mean market provision of
neighbourhood services rather than self-governance. Through interacting with property man-
agement companies, residents begin to understand their services and prefer them to other
government agencies for daily maintenance, reﬂecting Kirby’s (2008) argument that residents
choose “private governance” for practical reasons.
Furthermore, this study shows that diﬀerent forms of gated residential neighbourhoods recast
everyday practices diﬀerently, and the variegated implications of neighbourhood governance are
determined by the state–market relation. With control over socio-economic attributes, the
market-led form has a stronger preference for property management companies or homeowners’
associations due to emphasising the privatised provision of public goods and services. The local
government introduces market instruments for neighbourhood services, with the aim to facilitate
suburban land development and to retreat from providing serviced land. A state-led form is used
by the local government for land acquisition in the urban redevelopment process. It is not a
voluntary choice for residents regarding neighbourhood governance as they are relocated by the
local government. The mixed form has strong state intervention and thus oﬀers aﬀordability
rather than satisfying neighbourhood services to fulﬁl the local government’s political tasks of
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providing aﬀordable housing. The poor performance of private governance organisations under
state control reﬂects the visible role of the state in governing the mixed form and the state-led
form of gated residential development projects.
Evidence from Wenzhou shows that “private governance” in the Chinese context actually
means the commodiﬁcation of neighbourhood services, speciﬁcally delivered by property
management companies, rather than establishing self-governance through homeowners’ asso-
ciations. The changed approach to neighbourhood governance helps local government to
generate revenues from land and housing development during suburbanisation and regenera-
tion processes, holding back demand for self-governance from neighbourhoods. Although
employing diﬀerent management models of neighbourhood governance, the state holds a
key role in the process of neighbourhood governance transformation (Wu 2018b).
Consequently, gated residential neighbourhoods in urban China are a response to the state’s
intention to retreat from providing serviced land, while retaining neighbourhood control
through market instruments.
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